Friday, November 20, 2009

ABA Seminar on Delaware Corporate Law and Potentially Increasing Federalization

ABA Seminar on Delaware Corporate Law and Potentially Increasing Federalization

I am blogging from the ABA Business Law Section Fall Meeting in D.C. This post is the product of the notes taken at the following panel presentation:

Federalization of Corporation Law in a Time of Crisis - Which Institutions are Best Able to Improve Corporate Governance and Performance Going Forward. Presented by: Business and Corporate Litigation Committee and The Committee on the Federal Regulation of Securities

Moderator: Rolin P. Bissell, Partner, Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor LLP, Wilmington, DE

Speakers:

Hon. Myron T. Steele, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Delaware, Dover, DE

Hon. J. Travis Laster, Vice Chancellor, Delaware Court of Chancery, Wilmington, DE

Jill E. Fisch, Perry Golkin Professor of Law and Co-Director, Institute for Law and Economics, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Philadelphia, PA

Thomas J. Kim, Chief Counsel and Associate Director, Division of Corporation Finance, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, DC

Michele E. Rose, Partner, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC

The financial meltdown injected urgency to the debate about the roles of federal and state law in corporate governance. Members of the Delaware judiciary, federal regulators and practitioners debate who should make the rules on proxy access, executive compensation and fiduciary duties and what those rules should be.

N.B. The following overview is not a transcript and merely constitutes my highlights of some statements made by the speakers on the panel (the members of which may not necessarily agree with the accuracy of my notetaking.) My random notes are below each speaker's name.

The Hon. Myron T. Steele, Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court.

For many years, the corporate governance of the internal affairs of a corporation have been governed by the law of the state of incorporation. The allocation of authority between the board and the shareholders is governed by standards imposed by statute and case law, and by private ordering. The concept of federalization would seek to impose the same statutory standard to govern all 15,000 publicly held corporations. That standard would also be subject to various interpretations by 1,300 federal judges throughout the country. For example, is a federal standard that requires all corporations in all situations to separate the chairman and the CEO, too rigid?

Some suggested federal standards such as elimination of staggered boards, if we are consistent, should also make us reconsider the constitutional procedure of staggered elections for the U.S. Senate, which only stands for election in groups of one-third in each election cycle.

Most proposals are touted as giving shareholders more power, but would a single federal standard for all aspects of corporate governance truly give shareholders more power? The existing system is based on using the states, pursuant to federalism, to experiment with different options which allows shareholders to select which state they prefer. Regarding voting rights of shareholders, Delaware cases have carefully protected this franchise and have consistently prohibited any intereference with it.

As for disclosure, the Delaware Supreme Court (as constituted at that time), in Malone v. Brincat, made clear that the common law duty of disclosure applies when any information is disseminated by the board, even if no shareholder action is required.

The Chief Justice expressed his concern that federal legislation may be based on the false notion that corporate governance was the cause of the recent economic crisis, as opposed to regulatory enforcement, for example. As a concluding aside, His Honor suggested that boards should be enabled to fulfill their duty to focus on long-term maximization of shareholder wealth instead of spending an inordinate amount of time on compliance issues.

Thomas Kim, Chief Counsel and Associate Director, SEC Division of Corporation Finance.

The SEC's role has not changed. One of their goals is to regulate disclosures for the benefit of shareholders. For example, one requirement is that any director who does not attend at least 75% of all meetings be disclosed. Another example is the SOX requirement to disclose whether a financial expert is on the audit committee. Such disclosure requirements tend to impact behavior.
He would hope that state law is not displaced and in his view the SEC covers many matters not covered by state law. For example, disclosures regarding compensation are not covered by Delaware law. He quoted from the Delaware Chancery Court decision in Walt Disney in which the Court explained that the common law cannot require adherence to aspirational best practices. He sees the SEC's role as helping to form those aspirational goals.

Artificial lines cannot be drawn easily between "corporate governance" and governing the corporation itself as an entity. He is sensitive to the states' right to address the internal affairs of corporations. He was instrumental in bringing to the Delaware Supreme Court the issue addressed in the CA, Inc. case. His Division as a whole takes seriously the role of Delaware law, and as an example of that he announced the recent addition to their Division's ranks of a respected scholar on Delaware corporate law, Professor Larry Hamermesh.

The Hon. J. Travis Laster, Vice Chancellor, Delaware Court of Chancery.

Although His Honor noted that he has only "been on the job for 42 days", he referred to the knowledge he acquired from spending his entire career before ascending to the bench, involved in Delaware corporate litigation on behalf of both shareholders and management.

He views Delaware and the SEC as having a collaborative and symbiotic relationship especially in the area of disclosure. The common law system is not a regulatory one, and the Delaware Courts can only rule on cases that come before them when a suit is filed.

An important part of the "Delaware culture" is that Delaware is neither "pro-management" nor "pro-shareholder". Rather Delaware is "pro-balance" and in the long run the investors benefit by allowing management to have the presumption of the Business Judgment Rule to maximize the value of the corporation. While in practice, His Honor represented bidders and targets, as well as investors and management, in almost equal measure, as do most firms in Delaware.

As a policy matter, Delaware takes a long term view, and if Delaware was not attractive to investors on an ongoing basis, it could reprise the role of New Jersey of over a century ago, and quickly lose the role that it now plays.

The beneficiaries of fiduciary duties are the shareholders. Delaware does not have a "constituency statute". Another aspect of Delaware is that the board can internalize risk. The board can rely on contract rights for bondholders and fulfill its fiduciary duties to shareholders.

In the Healthsouth case, the Delaware Chancery Court hit hard and early to address the breach of the duty of loyalty in that case. One area where the Delaware Courts cannot act as quickly is the compensation of executives. These issues are classically covered by the Business Judgment Rule, but as the recent Chancery decision in Citicorp demonstrated, Delaware has found situations where, based on existing law, excess compensation will be addressed.

What about federalization issues? Due to the Delaware culture, and the balanced approach it takes, Delaware has not made any drastic changes in policy. In addition, there are only 5 members of the Court of Chancery and then on appeal, only 5 members of the Delaware Supreme Court that make decisions on Delaware corporate law. The history of the savings and loan crisis shows that dozens of U.S. District Courts ruling on the same statute, and conflicting decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeal on the same statutes, cause more confusion than consistency in the regulation of companies. In addition, unlike Federal judges, who are just are qualified, or moreso, Delaware judges have a more steady diet of corporate law issues, as compared to the more varied types of issues covered in the Federal Courts' docket.

The Delaware Constitution now allows the SEC to certify questions to the Delaware Supreme Court, which it has done. This is an example of collaboration.

The recent economic crisis can be explained more by massive debt and a federal policy that encouraged too much easy debt, as opposed to a problem with corporate governance.

Jill E. Fisch, Perry Golkin Professor of Law and Co-Director, Institute for Law and Economics, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Philadelphia, PA

The benefits of state law controlling this area include: incrementalism and experimenting. Also, there is a serious question about whether the federal proposals are better than the status quo.

There are studies, for example, that demonstrate that it does not always benefit shareholders to separate the CEO and Chairman. There is no statistical or empirical data to support the view that independent boards are necessarily "better" in terms of corporate performance. The NYSE has taken the view that independent boards are required. Delaware, however, has not mandated it in all cases, but takes it into account as a factor in the analysis. Though it impacts the standard of review, Delaware does not impose an independent board as a requirement.

As for executive compensation, the federal scheme pushed an option approach which turned out to be a source of many abuses. The Delaware approach is much more flexible, as befits a very nuanced and sensitive and multifaceted issue, as indicated in the Walt Disney case involving the compensation of Ovitz.

As for proxy access, for example, the recent efforts of the SEC indicate that the "one size fits all approach" is not the best solution.

Monday, November 16, 2009

The “Headquarters Test” or a Multifactor Approach? Hertz Corporation v. Friend, Argument Recap

The “Headquarters Test” or a Multifactor Approach?
Hertz Corporation v. Friend, Argument Recap

Below, Stanford Law School’s Sina Kian recaps yesterday’s oral argument in Hertz Corporation v. Friend. Sina’s earlier preview of the case is available here. Check the Hertz Corporation v. Friend (08-1107) SCOTUSwiki page for additional updates.

Yesterday the Court heard oral arguments in Hertz Corp. v. Friend. The case arose from a dispute over diversity jurisdiction, and the question presented was simple, or at least simple to state: how should courts determine a nationwide corporation’s “principal place of business”?

Justice Sotomayor—the most active Justice during this argument—set the tone by acknowledging that any rule was susceptible to reductio ad absurdum arguments: “the problem with every test is that you can find an exception that makes the application ridiculous.” Throughout the argument, several Justices voiced preliminary agreement that any rule should operate as a rebuttable presumption. But that left the question: what should be the default rule?

Arguing for Hertz Corp., Sri Srinivasan advocated for a headquarters test, which – as the name would suggest – locates the principal place of business in the State that hosts the corporation’s headquarters. Arguing for the respondents, Todd Schneider defended a multifactor test that focuses, in particular, on the primary location of a corporation’s “people and property.”

Srinivasan focused on the benefits of a simpler, more administrable test and emphasized the costs that would result if complex inquiries were necessary in each case to determine subject matter jurisdiction. This strategy could afford to settle for a draw on arguments about statutory construction and Congressional intent, thus allowing the Court to resort to a policy analysis and, presumably, the simplest rule.

Schneider, by contrast, generally focused on Congressional intent. The term “principal place of business” was plucked from the bankruptcy context, where most courts had employed a multifactor approach. The multifactor test is also more resistant to corporate efforts to game the system by strategically locating their headquarters, a general concern that explains why Section 1332 looks to the principal place of business in addition to the place of incorporation. This strategy placed administrability on the back burner to emphasize its portrayal of Hertz as advocating a change inconsistent with Congress’s intentions.

Both advocates’ narratives were pushed and peppered with primarily policy concerns. Justice Scalia was perhaps an exception to this focus: he stressed that if Congress wanted a multifactor approach, “it would have said, the principal State in which business is done.” Although each attorney received roughly the same number of comments and questions (approximately thirty-five for Hertz, compared with approximately thirty-seven for Friend), the Court seemed more anxious about the multifactor test. In particular, the primary concern about Hertz’s position – raised by Justice Sotomayor – dealt with how to define “headquarters,” whereas the consternation about a multifactor test ran a bit deeper. Justice Sotomayor noted confusion among the lower courts, while Justices Scalia and Ginsburg seemed dismayed that the multifactor test produces an outcome in which many national corporations are considered to be citizens of California just by virtue of the state’s size. The Chief Justice echoed this concern, noting that it would result in a quintessentially Washington corporation like Starbucks being deemed a citizen of California. Justice Ginsburg also emphasized that the respondents’ multifactor test is significantly more complex – which, as Justices Kennedy and Stevens noted, creates problems for smaller litigants.

Notably, the Court did not appear to have any concerns about its jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter under 28 U.S.C. §1453, a matter raised in petitioner’s brief.

Tuesday, November 3, 2009

Fiduciary Duty Argued at the U.S. Supreme Court

Fiduciary Duty Argued at the U.S. Supreme Court

Jones v. Harris is a case that was argued at the U.S. Supreme Court yesterday and is the focus of much scholarly commentary by corporate law professors around the blogosphere. We previously blogged here and here about the background of the case, which deals, among other things, with a federal statute that imposes a fiduciary duty on those who govern mutual funds. The main issue in this case is whether the management fees charged by particular mutual funds was excessive.

Professor Bainbridge offers insightful commentary here, citing to a Delaware Chancery Court case that addressed the related issue of executive compensation. Prof. William Birdthistle at The Conglomerate blog here offers a mini-symposium on the case and the various issues involved. Prof. Ribstein adds his scholarly analysis here.

Friday, October 16, 2009

Don’t just close your eyes and leap: top five issues in the Facebook terms of use



As we have helped businesses launch their exciting, new Facebook Pages, we’ve learned that there are some common concerns with Facebook’s rules. For this article, we have picked out five key issues for your company to consider. Ideally, your company will discuss these issues with your employees before your Page is launched, but even if you already have a Page, it is not too late to reduce your company’s legal risk in several areas.

Issue 1: Did your employee set up a Page, a Group, or a Profile? Hopefully, the answer is a Page.

We will explain the terminology and then the reason why a Page is the best option for business use. Facebook Pages provide a way for “[a] public figure, business, or brand … to share information, interact with their [sic] fans, and create a highly engaging presence on Facebook.”

Private individuals create Profiles to share information with their Friends. Businesses create Pages, and instead of Friends, Pages have Fans. Anyone can create a Group and can set it up to have open or closed membership. Pages have a Wall, where the owner and Fans can, if the owner allows it, post content including comments, photos, and videos. (For an example of a Page with only basic content, check out the Procter & Gamble Page; for a Page with some extra content, check out the Coca-Cola Page.) Unlike a Profile, a Page must be publicly available and must share all content with all Facebook users. Pages can only be created and maintained by an official representative of an organization, and Profiles can only be created and maintained by a private individual. For a number of reasons, businesses will usually want to have a Page rather than a Group. For example, Pages can communicate with an unlimited number of Fans; Group messages are limited to 5,000 people. Page administrators' identities are shielded; Group administrators' identities are disclosed. When the administrator of a Page posts a comment, it appears to come from the company; when a Group administrator posts a comment, it appears to come from that individual. The way this issue can trip up your company is that a Group can never be converted into a Page. If your employee sets up a Group and gets lots of people to join it and sets up a great infrastructure for your company on Facebook, but then your company realizes that it really would prefer to have a Page, it cannot convert the Group into a Page. Its only option is to set up a Page and notify the Group members and have them re-join as Fans – a sure way to lose some people in the process.

Issue 2: Will your company be liable for user-generated content?

Once you launch your Page, Fans may be allowed to post comments, photos, and videos. What if one of those comments, photos, or videos infringes someone else’s copyright? If your company has allowed user-generated content on its main website, it has probably protected itself by complying with the safe harbor provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). It may want to consider protecting itself under the same law on its Facebook Page.

The safe harbor requires your company to provide contact information for someone who can take down allegedly infringing material, to take down allegedly infringing material upon request, and to comply with some other requirements. Generally, DMCA compliance is described in a website’s Terms of Service. If you operate a Page that allows users to post anything at all, you should consider posting a Terms of Service for your Page that includes DMCA compliance, along with the other terms usual for a website that allows users to post content. As of now, most Facebook Pages do not have Terms of Service, partially because Facebook appeared to take responsibility for Pages’ DMCA take-down notices in the past. Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities now makes it clear that Pages must have their own DMCA policies.

Examples of Page Terms of Use can be seen on the Coca-Cola Page and the 1-800-FLOWERS.COM Page. Another copyright issue Page owners face is that there are no technological blocks to users taking and re-using all content posted on Pages. This includes your company’s photos, posts and comments, as well as your Fans’ photos, posts and comments.

There are also “Share” links for most items on Facebook, which allow users to repost content to their own Walls in their Profiles, thereby sharing that content with their own Friends. This poses a bit of a copyright conundrum. Under copyright law, if a Fan posts something to your Page, no one can use it in any way except to view it on your Page. Other Fans cannot repost it; you or other Fans cannot incorporate it into other works; you cannot use it in your advertising within or outside Facebook. If the Fan who owns the copyrighted material gets wind of certain kinds of use by others (particularly uses outside Facebook), or simply decides that s/he regrets having shared the material in the first place, you or your other Fans can face liability for re-using the material in ways that are expected within the world of Facebook. You may want to consider including license provisions in your Terms of Use for your Facebook Page. Some Page owners make all materials posted to the Page subject to a Creative Commons Copyright license.


Essentially, that license allows anyone to re-use the material in any way so long as they aren’t making any money directly off of it. Other types of licenses can also be included in Terms of Use for a Page. As for defamatory or other illegal content that users might post, in most cases, your company would be protected by the Communications Decency Act. However, you can remove offensive user posts, and you can set up user rules and expectations in your Page’s Terms of Use to reduce your risk. If you plan to set up a Page that you expect will provoke controversial posts by users, you should discuss this issue with your attorney.


Issue 3: Does your company have to do anything to protect its Fans’ privacy?

Facebook requires a Page to have a privacy policy if the Page “collect[s] user information.” Facebook defines information as “facts and other information about you, including actions you take.” A Page inevitably collects user information when a user becomes a Fan (including the fact that the user has become a Fan, the user’s full name, and, depending on the user’s privacy settings, the user’s profile photo) and may collect additional information (for example, when a user makes a Wall post or posts a Fan photo), so this policy seems to require that all Pages have their own privacy policies. However, currently, most Pages do not maintain privacy policies. In the outside world, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) has stringent requirements for websites directed to children under age 13, including that they must have a privacy policy and what that privacy policy must contain. Many activities that are fine offline are restricted online due to COPPA. Furthermore, many sites that are not directed to children choose to have a privacy policy with a statement that they are not directed to children and will delete any information about a child under age 13 that they may have inadvertently collected.


The Federal Trade Commission, which enforces COPPA, has been pursuing violators recently to the tune of over $1 million in fines in the past year, and state Attorneys General also have enforcement authority. A website (or Facebook Page) may expose its owner to liability in all fifty states. “But,” you may say, “Facebook prohibits children under 13 from using the site, and I can age-restrict who is able to see my Page via the Edit Page Settings menu. So why should I worry about COPPA?” Facebook’s age restrictions give only false comfort. Anyone can sign up for the site using any date of birth; Facebook does nothing to verify identities or ages. In addition, people who may or may not be the parents of the children in question post information about children under age 13 often, both in their personal Profiles and on Pages. We have seen, for example, videos of children posted to Pages, with tags or comments containing identifying information about the children. The person posting the video generally says he or she is the child’s parent, but there is no way to verify this within Facebook. A child’s full name alone is enough to trigger a COPPA violation, so the risk of inadvertently violating the law is high, especially for companies whose products are marketed to the under-13 set in the real world.


Privacy considerations bring up one more issue on Facebook related to Issue 1 above: organizations are prohibited from maintaining a Profile instead of a Page. This is for the very good reason that the owner of a Profile has access to a great deal of personal information about any Friend, depending partially upon the Friend’s privacy settings. A Page, however, has access only to Fans’ names, possibly their photos, and the fact that they are Fans, unless the Fan affirmatively chooses to provide additional information. Your organization could inadvertently collect information from Facebook users that it cannot use and does not want, if it maintains a Profile instead of a Page.


Issue 4: Is there anything special your company should consider before setting up an account?

Facebook is not designed for businesses: as the Privacy Policy says, “We built Facebook to make it easy to share information with your friends and people around you.” If nothing else in this post convinces you of this, the rules for administration of Pages via user accounts should. Facebook allows individuals to maintain one of two kinds of accounts: a business account or a personal account. A person’s business account cannot run searches on Facebook and does not have a Profile; it is used only to administer Pages and advertisements on Facebook. A person’s business account can be converted to a personal account by clicking an ever-present “Create Your Profile” button at the top of the page. Once this has been done, the account cannot be converted back to a business account. A person cannot have both a personal account and a business account; as Facebook’s Help section on business accounts says, “[p]lease be aware that managing multiple accounts is a serious violation of Facebook’s Terms of Use. If we determine that an individual has more than one account, we reserve the right to terminate all of their accounts.” Pages are administered via people’s existing personal or business Facebook accounts.


Each Facebook account must be maintained by only a single individual; Facebook’s policies prohibit sharing or transfer of accounts. However, Pages may have multiple administrators. Each administrator has full edit rights and can add or delete other administrators. The only administrator who cannot be deleted is the one who started a Page. So if you have an employee start a Page for your organization, s/he will always have full edit access to your Page, whether the setup is done via a personal or a business Facebook account. In sum: an account set up to start a Page is the property of the employee who sets it up and cannot be transferred to another employee. Multiple employees also cannot administer a Page via the same account, whether it is a business account or a personal account. Employees who maintain both a personal account for personal use and a business account for use in association with maintaining your Page risk losing both their personal and business accounts. Companies are currently grappling with who should be the administrator who starts a Page and whether they need a written agreement with that person to protect the company’s interests. Employees are currently grappling with whether they want to use their personal Facebook accounts to manage projects for their employer and/or their employer’s customers.

Issue 5: Are there any quirky rules of which your company should be aware?

Facebook prohibits users from running contests on Facebook without written permission from Facebook. In our experience, Facebook often takes months to respond to inquiries, if it ever does so. Contests are also subject to the Facebook Promotions Guidelines, which are short, sweet and straight to the point: you cannot promote your contest as being on Facebook, indicate that Facebook has approved or is affiliated with your contest, or administer the contest on Facebook unless it is via an Application on the Facebook Platform. We will save the complicated rules governing Applications for another time. If your company wants to run a contest on Facebook, it will require significant lead time and research to comply with Facebook’s rules.

Conclusion

Business adoption of Facebook is moving at light speed. We hope that Facebook will amend some of its rules to make them more realistic and helpful for business use. In the meantime, companies should work closely with their legal advisors to protect themselves to the greatest extent possible as they leap into the social networking world. The issues we discuss here are based on the August 28, 2009 revision to the Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities (which most sites call their Terms of Use), so please bear in mind that Facebook may have made one of its frequent revisions since the time of our writing. The date of the latest revision appears at the top of the Statement of Rights and Responsibilities page. If you want to stay up-to-date on changes to Facebook’s policies governing users in general and Pages in particular, add yourself as a fan of the Facebook Site Governance Page and the Facebook Pages / Public Profiles Page. (As you will see in the discussion of Issue 4 above, this can only be done via a personal account with a Profile, and not via a business account)

Dorsey & Whitney LLP Jamie N. Nafziger and Kelcey Patrick-Ferree


Monday, October 5, 2009

Child’s Game of “Go Fish” is a Poor Model for e-Discovery Search

Go FishRemember the child’s card game Go Fish? You know the one, where each player keeps their own cards secret and tries to guess what cards the others have? You try to get all four of the same rank cards. One player asks another if they have a certain card, such as: do you have any Kings? If that player has any Kings, they have to give them to the requesting player. If not, they say: Go Fish, ha ha, you did not guess right, and then it is the next players turn. (By the way, this game is typically played by very young children.) Based upon the requests one player makes, the other players guess what cards they want. They then try to discard those cards in such a way that the player cannot get to them. The whole enjoyment of the game is derived from not knowing for sure what cards the other players have and from keeping your own card-seeking goals secret. It can take quite a while to guess right and get all four suits of the same rank card. The game goes on until one player wins by only holding four-of-a-kind cards. The game is usually won by the person who is the lucky guesser. There is, to put it mildly, not much skill involved, which is why young kids love the game and older kids don’t.

Most Lawyers Do Search as if it were a Game of Go Fish

I submit that the negotiated key word search model prevalent in e-discovery today uses the same guessing game model as Go Fish. The party requesting ESI guesses what key words might produce evidence to support their case. Do you have any emails that use the keyword “King.” It is necessarily a guess as to what keywords to use because the requesting party cannot see the responding party’s cards. Only the responding party sees all of their own cards, and that is as it should be.

The responding party has a right to privacy. They should not be required to give the requesting party the keys to the server room, the whole deck of cards. The requesting party is either suing the responding party, or being sued by the responding party. Either way, the requesting party should not be permitted to enter and search every nook and cranny of their adversary’s inner sanctum. They should not be granted unfettered access to run ever-more-sophisticated search tools to look for something, anything, that might be incriminating. That kind of fishing expedition has long been prohibited by most courts in the United States. See eg.: Omnicare, Inc. v. Mariner Health Care Management Co., 2009 WL 1515609 at *3 (Del.Ch. May 29, 2009); Hedenburg v. Aramark American Food Services, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3443 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2007). The advances of technology should not be permitted to change that rule. No, the rule must remain, but the game itself should change.

go fishThe way the game is now often played, the requesting party also keeps their secrets. They do not want to reveal exactly what it is that they are looking for. But this is, I contend, not as it should be. The requesting player is misusing the paper-world work product doctrine to hide their true discovery intentions. They accomplish this by using broad, general requests. That keeps secret what they really want. They claim a work product right to do so to protect their mental impressions and case strategy. Then they go after what they really want by playing the key word guessing game, both before and after the production. Not all requesters play this way on purpose. This explanation assumes that they have done their home work. It assumes that they know what the issues are and what evidence they need to prove the issues. It assumes that they know what they want, which, for some practitioners, is not always true. Some practitioners have no idea what the real issues are and what they are looking for.

Regardless of the reason for the requesting party’s non-disclosure, this system of discovery by guesses on effective keywords is a model of inefficiency. It may be fun to the players involved, some of whom may reap huge fees in the process, such as the responding party’s lawyers and vendors. It is not, however, designed to get the right cards on the table in the quickest and cheapest way possible. Quite the contrary – it is designed to stretch out the process in an iterative series of negotiated key words and searches. This process involves as much chance as skill.

This kind of approach to the pursuit of truth to attain justice is unreliable and inefficient. The process not only takes too long, the many bad guesses on keywords create a vast quantity of false hits. In the world of information science, that is called poor precision. A ninety percent miss-ratio is not uncommon. That is, for every ten documents that contain the specified keywords, nine are irrelevant, and only one is relevant. This 10% precision rate necessarily results in a tremendous waste of reviewer time. The irrelevant documents retrieved by the search are called false positives. The responding party must then spend a small fortune to screen the many false positives for relevance and privilege.

The Go Fish approach also misses many relevant documents. In the world of information science this is called a poor recall rate. The relevant documents not found are called false negatives. Again, a recall rate of only twenty percent, where eighty percent of the relevant ESI is missed, is not uncommon. This raises questions of the fairness of the process. Can justice be served when only 20% of the relevant ESI is located?

We Need a New Game

We must redesign the game of e-discovery search as it is now commonly played. We should design a new game where the responding party picks the search methods, not the requesting party. In this new game the goal is speedy, just and inexpensive discovery. Get the right cards on the table in a quick, fair and efficient manner. With this goal in mind, it is obvious that the cards should be picked by the person holding them, the responding party. The responding party should design the search strategy, not the requesting party. It is, after all, their hand, and so they can see for themselves what search procedures and terms will work or not.

playing cards

In order for this new game to work, the responding party needs to know what the requesting party is really looking for. What cards do they want? They might be able to find them, but not if they do not know what they are looking for. Thus, for example, if the goal is to find all deuces, then the requesting party should specifically say so, rather than request all cards that are less than 5. Thus, in this new game the requesting party must show their hand first, they must explain what they need and why. Both sides need to discuss and narrow the issues and be frank and open about discovery. Then the responding party can then look at their own cards and see which are responsive to the defined issues. This approach is consistent with the goal of this new game: both sides work together to find the cards that the requester wants and get them on the table as fast as possible.

blindmanThis new game can only work if the search is controlled by the responding party. It is, after all, their data, their IT systems, their data custodians, their employees, their agents, their attorneys, their language, their retention policies, their retention practices, etc. The responding party is not blind like the requesting party. They are in a far better position to design the culling and search strategies, including key words. They are in a far better position to find the information that the requesting party wants. They will know how to find all of the number 2 cards, assuming they have any. The responding party may still find nothing and say Go Fish. But the process will be much faster and less expensive than iterative Blind Man’s Bluff keyword negotiations.

The game as played now forces the blind man to make hundreds of guesses at a time, hundreds of key words, hoping that a few might be right. This hurts the respondent who has to review all of the junk generated by the blind guesses. It hurts the requester too, who eventually has to review all of the relevant and marginal calls. It is a colossal waste of time. It is inefficient even if the requester is given several guesses, not just one, and does some refining and talking in between the turns. That only makes the process slightly less wasteful.

Bottom line – we need to stop fooling around with search in e-discovery. That means taking the blindfolds off, but more fundamentally, it means redefining the goals of the game of discovery itself. All too often the goal of discovery today is to try to take your adversaries secrets, but keep your own. Lawyers try to win a case by discovery. Perhaps because they have so few trials, they lose track of the fact that discovery is not supposed to be an end in itself. It is just supposed to be a preparation for trial.

Trial is the time and place for the adversarial process and arguments, not discovery. Many litigators today forget this. They focus instead on a game where they try to only show their good cards, the ones that support their positions. Conversely, they try to keep secret all of their bad cards, the ones that undercut their positions or support the opposition’s positions. For them the goal of discovery is to put only their good cards on the table and keep their bad cards face down in the discard pile.

Today’s paradigm of negotiated search terms perpetuates that adversarial discovery model. It encourages feigned cooperation where each side secretly hopes that the other side will guess wrong. For if that happens, and bad search terms are picked, they will not have to show their bad cards. They can manipulate and hide the truth.

The New Game of Discovery is Won when Completed with Enough Money Still Left for Trial

This perverse game of selective disclosure might have worked in the paper world (although that is debatable), but it no longer works now. We now have a Saganesque number of cards – billions and billions. No one can afford to play this game any more. It should be obvious by now that if you play this game, you will quickly run out of time and money for the real game – the true purpose of litigation – a trial on the merits. How else do you explain a 96% settlement rate in federal court? Yes, trials are expensive. But if discovery were to cost less than it does now, perhaps far less, then there would be adequate resources remaining after discovery to conduct a trial.

Under the new cooperative based, producer-search-driven discovery here proposed, the trials themselves would also become simpler and more streamlined. If lawyers did not play the old games of truth manipulation, and just let the chips fall where they may, many unnecessary side issues would fade away before trial. When bad facts come out early, pseudo-issues go away early too. This inevitably results in fewer issues remaining for trial. Thus if discovery was changed as here recommended, the cost of trials could also be reduced.

The new goal here proposed for discovery is to find and place all of the important cards on the table as quickly and efficiently as possible. This requires cooperation and transparency on both sides. It requires the requesting party to explain what cards they want and why. It also requires them to make precise and narrow requests directed to specific, important issues in the case.

This new game also requires cooperation and transparency by the responding party, moreover it requires their initiative and leadership. The responding party can no longer just sit back and watch poor guesses being made. They must take the lead in getting the truth out. This is a burden, but the responding party is more than compensated for this burden by the protection this provides from over-broad, expensive, inefficient search. It also protects the responding party from having to show their whole deck of cards, their entire ESI collection. The protection of privacy rights is an important factor to many.

The party responding to requests for production must be proactive. They must design the search. As discussed, this only makes sense because it is their data. They have unfettered access to it. They know the language. They know the people involved. For these reasons, the responding party is always in the best position to search the data and, if asked, to fully explain how and why the search met the needs of the requesting party. The process must be transparent. It must also be performed competently. This may sometimes require the employment of experts and search design specialists.

Once the cards responsive to the request are found, they all have to be disclosed, the bad as well as the good. The only exception is privileged documents, which are logged. Honesty and good faith are critical in all discovery processes.

The process may still sometimes be iterative. A careful study by the requesting party of the ESI received may lead to new goals, new issues, and new more focused requests. But still, two fast, focused searches beats one long, over-broad search any day.

This is a new discovery game where both sides win if they complete discovery on time and under budget. This is restrained discovery where the parties only search for the facts they really need. This is discovery where all of the facts are freely disclosed, not just the ones that help your position. This is discovery that typically ends when the budget is exhausted, not the attorneys. For we all know that attorneys are hard working and capable of billing a mind boggling number of hours. These long hours will end in this new game because attorneys will no longer have to try to shape the truth. They will instead cooperate to put the truth on the table. They will save their arguments for what the facts mean under the governing law. This is cost-conscious, proportional discovery where, once completed, sufficient resources still remain for a trial on the merits.

fish or cut bait

This new game of discovery that I propose, along with many others, is designed for trials, not perpetual preparation. It is a model for those who want to fish, not just “cut bait.” It is a model for all true trial lawyers.

The new rules proposed here apply equally to plaintiff and defendant. Discovery is and will continue to be a two-way street. Both parties will have to find the cards that the other side is looking for. Then, they must put their cards on the table; good, bad or indifferent. If the cards do not exist, and this may happen often, the producer will have to explain exactly what they did. They will also have to remain open to additional searches.

Conclusion

I propose that producing parties always take the lead in the search of their own information. This does not mean that the requesting parties should do nothing and just accept with a smile whatever is handed to them. They will have a seat at the table. They will be heard, but clairvoyance will not be required. I propose a collaborative, transparent process where unnecessary application of the work product doctrine is curbed in favor of efficiency.

Wheres WaldoIndeed, although the responding party can see-all and thus must lead the search, the requesting party should always still play a key role. First of all, they have to fully describe what their Waldo looks like. In discovery each issue has its own Waldo and its own ideal search methodology to find him. There are recurrent patterns, especially where the responding party has gone through the drill many times. Yet there is rarely a one-size-fits-all search strategy, any more than there is a one-size-fits-all legal strategy.

The requesting party can, if they wish, make more contributions beyond describing their Waldos. The producing party may seek their advice. The requesting party may sometimes have far greater search expertise. Even if they do not, they may still have some good ideas and be able to contribute to the search process.

A leader with vision does not mean a dictator, nor does it imply blind obedience. The responding party should lead, but should also explain everything they did, or plan to do. They should be willing to answer all questions and to ask questions. They should be willing to listen if the other side has something to say. They should be open to constructive suggestions.

If the requester is not cooperative, the responder should also be willing to assume risks. The responding party should be ready and willing to go on their own if need be. They should be ready to explain everything to the supervising judge. The judges can help make this new game work, especially in circumstances of an uncooperative requester. The courts can do this by affirming all reasonable search efforts, absent only a showing of bad faith.

This new game is not a competitive game where one side wins and another loses. Either they both find Waldo or they both lose. The win-lose part of the process comes next. It comes after discovery when the case is decided by summary judgment or tried before a judge and jury. That is the way it should be. Neither discovery nor mediation are adequate substitutes for adjudication.

The new game of discovery here proposed implements strategic cooperation. In this way we can regain our adversary system of justice. We can start doing trials again, instead of playing endless rounds of Go Fish.

________________

I look forward to your comments and help in flushing out the details of this proposal. Please leave a comment below. This is just the beginning. No doubt I have missed some issues and may have gotten a few wrong. What do you think?

Tuesday, September 15, 2009

Zynga Settles Mob Wars Litigation As It Settles In To Playdom Fight


  • 15 Comments
by Michael Arrington on September 13, 2009

Social game startup Zynga sure does get into a lot of legal fights. Just as they settle down to business with the Playdom you-stole-our-playbook fight, we’ve confirmed that they settled a different lawsuit – one where they were playing defense.

In February 2009 Mob Wars creator David Maestri sued Zynga for copyright infringement. Zynga’s game Mafia Wars – a text-based game very similar to Mob Wars – was just too much of a copy of Mob Wars, said Maestri. Maestri himself had only recently cleared up his own rights to the game after a scuffle with his former employer, SGN.

The Maestri-Zynga lawsuit has now been settled as well. The rumor was that Maestri was demanding $10 million from Zynga to settle the litigation. Ultimately, says one source, he got a payment in the “high seven figures.” So that implies something like $7 – $9 million.

Wonder why the settlement was so high? It’s hard to believe, but Mob Wars was pulling in an estimated $1 million/month at one point from users eager to upgrade their weapons and other stuff. These games seem silly, but real money flows through them from virtual goods.

Not a bad payday for Maestri. And it also highlights the fact that none of these companies have a completely clean record when it comes to respecting the intellectual property of competitors.

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Has the New Round of Banking-Related Litigation Begun?

Has the New Round of Banking-Related Litigation Begun?

As the number of failed and troubled banks has surged, one recurring question has been whether the banks woes would lead to a new round of banking-related litigation. While a few lawsuits had emerged in connection with earlier bank failures (refer here), there really has been nowhere near the number of suits as might be expected from the number of trouble banks – until now, perhaps. The arrival of a couple of bank loan loss reserve lawsuits this past week, as well as other banking-related developments, raises the question whether the conjectured round of bank related lawsuits may now have begun.

First, on September 8, 2009, plaintiffs filed a securities class action lawsuit in the Central District of California against Pacific Capital Bancorp and certain of its directors and officers, as well as a stock analyst that follows the bank’s stock. According to the plaintiff’s counsel’s September 8, 2009 press release (here), the complaint alleges that the defendants misled investors by representing that:

that the Company was maintaining a strong allowance for loan losses which would enable it to absorb losses in its portfolio. As alleged in the complaint, defendants’ misstatements and omissions relating to Pacific Capital’s loan loss provision caused the Company’s common stock to trade at artificially inflated levels between April 30, 2009, when the Company reported that it maintained its loan loss provision at a very high level, through July 30, 2009, when the Company admitted that it had not adequately reserved for loan losses, had not applied a conservative reserve methodology, and needed to record an additional loan loss provision of $117 million. The "buy" rating issued by the analyst defendants on the Company’s common stock also contributed, as alleged, at certain times during the Class Period to the artificial inflation in the price of Pacific Capital stock.

Second, on September 11, 2009, plaintiffs filed a securities class action lawsuit in the Northern District of California against UCBH Holding and certain of its directors and officers. (UCBH Holding is a bank holding company for United Commercial Bank, a California-state chartered bank with its headquarters in San Francisco, refer here.) According to the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ September 11, 2009 press release (here), the complaint alleges:

UCBH knowingly falsified its financial statements by concealing the rising level of loan losses and non-performing loans through a series of improper accounting tricks and outright deception of regulators and auditors. On September 8, 2009, UCBH announced that its Chairman and CEO, Thomas Wu, and its Chief Credit Officer, Ebrahim Shabudin, were resigning following the results of an investigation of the improper loan accounting. As a result of the accounting improprieties, UCBH must restate its financial statements for each quarter and the full fiscal year of 2008. News of the accounting fraud and the pending restatement caused UCBH's stock price to fall significantly, damaging investors.

The complaint can be found here.

The final related development this past week took place on Friday night after the close of business, when the FDIC closed Corus Bank, N.A. about which refer here. (The FDIC actually closed three banks on Friday, refer here, bringing the 2009 year to date total number of bank failures to 92.) Though Corus only just now failed, the bank’s holding company and certain of its directors and officers had already been sued earlier this year (refer here) in a securities class action lawsuits in the Northern District of Illinois alleging that:

(i) that Corus was failing to recognize losses on its condominium loans in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"); (ii) that Corus and/or its affiliates was purchasing condominiums in developments Corus had financed in an attempt to: (a) inflate the appraised values of condominiums to delay having to recognize losses on financing for such condominiums; (b) inflate developers’ sales figures to increase the likelihood of successful future sales; and (c) create the illusion of successful sales histories in order to inflate appraisal values for the condominiums to ensure inflated future prices for the condominiums; and (iii) that Corus was involved in detailed and in-depth negotiations with the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the Office of the Comptroller of Currency regarding its deteriorating pool of condominium loans.

The arrival of the new lawsuits and the development involving Corus all in this past week may well have been coincidental. It remains to be seen whether there will in fact be a significant number of additional lawsuits involving failed or troubled banks.

That said, there is definitely a familiar tone to these recent cases. The allegations regarding the various banks’ alleged loan loss reserve deficiencies and alleged failure to recognize failing loans will be quite familiar to anyone who was involving in any way in the wave of failed bank litigation that accompanied the last round of failed banks during the S&L crisis. Though the future is uncertain, it is difficult no to speculate that we will see many more of these kinds of loan loss reserve inadequacy cases in the months ahead.

Of course, even if the cases do arrive in significant numbers, that does not necessarily mean that they will succeed. Some cases previously filed in connection with banks that failed in 2008 have already been dismissed. For example, the Fremont General lawsuit (refer here) and the Downey Financial lawsuit (refer here) have both been dismissed, and in Downey Financial’s case, the dismissal is with prejudice.

Nevertheless, the most recent filings seem to suggest that plaintiffs’ lawyers are not deterred by the prior dismissals. Given the depth of the current difficulties in the banking sector (about which refer here), there may yet be more, perhaps much more, banking-related litigation to come.

Citigroup Auction Rate Securities Lawsuit Dismissed: On September 11, 2009, Southern District of New York Judge Laura Taylor Swain dismissed the auction rate securities lawsuit that had been filed Citigroup. A copy of the September 11 opinion can be found here.

This action follows the earlier dismissals of the auction rate securities lawsuits that had been filed against UBS (refer here) and Northern Trust (refer here). However, this dismissal represents its own separate development, because unlike many of the other auction rate securities lawsuits, which were based on alleged misrepresentations in connection with the sale of the securities, the Citigroup auction rate securities lawsuit was based on a market manipulation theory.

As reflected in greater detail here, the plaintiff in the Citigroup auction rate securities lawsuit had alleged "defendants manipulated the market for Citigroup ARS by fostering the illusion that a valid market existed where buyers and sellers came together, with supply and demand in balance, allowing for the successful completion of auctions of Citigroup ARS. In fact, no such balance existed." The defendants moved to dismiss.

In her September 11 order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, Judge Swain held with respect to the plaintiff’s market manipulation claim under Section 10(b) of the ’34 Act that the plaintiffs had insufficiently alleged fraud; scienter; reliance; and loss causation. She also dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under the Investment Advisers Act for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the plaintiffs’ state law claims because they were preempted by SLUSA.

With respect to the plaintiffs’ market manipulation claim, she found the plaintiff’s fraud allegations insufficient because the complaint "does not include specific allegations as to which Defendants performed what manipulative acts at what times and with what effect" but instead that the complaint "relies on general and conclusory allegations regarding Defendants’ practices" regarding the ARS auctions. She concluded that "absent particularized allegations regarding Defendants’ alleged manipulative conduct, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for market manipulation."

With regard the plaintiff’s scienter allegations, Judge Swain found that the plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged motive and opportunity, holding that "Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations regarding Defendants’ motive for the alleged manipulation focus principally on Defendants’ desire to sell Citigroup ARS to offset subprime losses and to obtain fees for services in connection with the auctions." She found these allegations "too generalized to meet the scienter pleading requirement."

She also found that plaintiff had failed to allege particularize facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter based on circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness. She found that "the very market conditions – specifically the ‘subprime crisis’ – that Plaintiffs cites in his Complaint…give rise to an opposing and compelling inference that Defendants engaged only in bad (in hindsight) business judgments in connection with the ARS, and did not engage in the alleged conduct with an intent to deceive."

Judge Swain found further that the plaintiff had not adequately alleged reliance. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Swain specifically reference an SEC report that preceded the class period in which many of the practices of which the plaintiff complains regarding the ARS market auction process. These materials "disclosed that the ARS market was not necessarily set by the ‘natural interplay of supply and demand’" and therefore Plaintiff has not identified any basis on which the class reasonably could have relied on "the market ‘integrity’ assumption."

Finally, Judge Swain found that the market manipulation claim also fails because the plaintiff’s loss causation allegations are insufficient. In reaching this conclusion, she observed that "Plaintiff does not specifically allege that he tried to sell his ARS, nor does he allege that the interest rates set through Defendants’ manipulative conduct were lower than they would have been absent such conduct."

The dismissal granted in Judge Swain’s September 11 ruling is without prejudice; the plaintiff has until October 1, 2009 to file an amended complaint.

I have in any event added the Citigroup auction rate securities dismissal to my table of subprime and credit crisis-related lawsuit dismissal motion ruling, which can be accessed here.

Special thanks to Adam Savett of the Securities Litigation Watch blog (here) for providing me with a copy of Judge Swain’s ruling.

Wednesday, August 5, 2009

A growing trend: Social media as legal evidence

A growing trend: Social media as legal evidence

by Chris Wheelock | Michigan Business Review
Wednesday July 29, 2009, 12:30 PM

The Internet has evolved from casual browsing of shopping sites and one-way information portals to the current craving for interaction and a more personal connection.

Today, more people are using social networking sites like LinkedIn, Facebook, MySpace and Twitter than ever before.

In a report on the influence of social media sites released earlier this year, the Nielsen Company, a media research firm, found that not only are more people using the Internet and for longer periods of time, users are spending the most time on social networking sites and on video portals such as YouTube.

According to Nielsen, social network use in February exceeded Web-based e-mail use for the first time (in monthly visits).

As Internet use has exploded, so has the legal use of information mined from the Web and social media sites.

Investigators, divorce attorneys, prosecutors and employers are finding information, photos and videos online which can become evidence in civil and criminal cases or simply become a reason not to hire someone.

In 2006, Congress mandated changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, expanding the acceptance of electronically stored information, or ESI, as evidence.

Internet security experts say many users give little thought to what they post online or include in their online profiles. It's a decision that can lead to getting fired, reprimanded or even arrested for what's been posted.

That's where Daniel Estrada, president of D.C. Estrada of Grand Rapids, has built a niche for himself. His firm specializes in assessing the electronic information needs and risks of companies, managing electronic evidence when a company is sued and helping companies large and small establish policies for handling electronic data.

"It was a one-way medium in the early days," Estrada said. "It's now a more dynamic medium, where you have people creating content and adding content to the Web -- content that is available for anybody else to see."

Therein lies the problem, because much of what gets posted becomes a permanent record somewhere. Facebook, for example, retains all your information even if you close your account.

Photos contain a lot of embedded information that most users aren't aware of: GPS coordinates showing where the photo was taken and when, even the camera's serial number. Estrada says the embedded information can be read out of that photo and used as evidence.

The business world has also discovered social networking sites, which can be a powerful marketing tool. They can also become a receptacle for complaints about bad customer service or employee comments about the company -- two good reasons to make managing your online reputation a priority.

Business owners are struggling with how to come to terms with all this.

Estrada notes that when a business embraces social media as a marketing tool, some common issues crop up, including the loss of employee productivity and the important distinction of whether an employee is representing the company or themselves when they use social networking sites at work.

"That's where having a documented policy, a clear and concise policy that outlines acceptable use of social media tools, is really important," Estrada said.

Companies use social networking sites as part of the hiring process, including asking job candidates to log in to their Facebook account during an interview.

Estrada says employers are looking for information about a person's character, their social habits or anything that speaks to a person's integrity.

"Don't put anything on a social network page, blog, Web site or in an e-mail," he said, "that you don't want printed on the front page of the newspaper."

Estrada and others recommend businesses think through what kind of policy they want to put in place when it comes to social media sites. Managers should know the technology and what kinds of tools are being used by their organization, considerations that are evolving.

Contact Business Review at br@mbusinessreview.com, or follow our news on Twitter @BusinessReview.

Calif. Supreme Court Allows ‘Narrowly Tailored’ Employee Surveillance

Labor & Employment

Calif. Supreme Court Allows ‘Narrowly Tailored’ Employee Surveillance

Posted 1 hour, 1 minute ago
By Debra Cassens Weiss

The California Supreme Court has ruled in an invasion of privacy suit that a company isn’t liable for installing secret video equipment in an employee’s office for legitimate business reasons.

The court said placement of the camera in an office shared by two workers in a facility for abused children wasn’t egregious, and the employer had a valid reason to do it, the Recorder reports.

The Hillsides Children's Center in Pasadena had installed the hidden equipment in an attempt to find out who was viewing child porn on a computer during early morning hours. The two workers who shared the office, office manager Abigail Hernandez and administrative assistant Maria Lopez, were not suspects and the camera, which operated only after business hours, did not record them or catch the person using the computer, according to the story.

The court said it did not intend to encourage surveillance, but in this case it was permissible.

"Activation of the surveillance system was narrowly tailored in place, time and scope, and was prompted by legitimate business concerns,” the opinion said. "Plaintiffs were not at risk of being monitored or recorded during regular work hours and were never actually caught on camera or videotape."

Wednesday, June 24, 2009

Textbook Case of Discovery Abuse Exposes a Fallacious “Pig in a Poke” Defense

Textbook Case of Discovery Abuse Exposes a Fallacious “Pig in a Poke” Defense

pig in a pokeA Senior District Court Judge in Atlanta recently considered sanctions in what he referred to as a textbook case of discovery abuse: Kipperman v. Onex Corp., 2009 WL 1473708 (N.D.Ga., May 27, 2009). I agree. The nineteen page opinion by Judge J. Owen Forrester describes the conduct of defendants and their attorneys. The core of the abuse was defendants’ pig in a poke defense where they argued that there was no way to know if any email of value existed on backup tapes, so there was no need to spend the money to look. Clever argument, but for the fact that, according to Judge Forrester at least, defense counsel knew, or should have known, that there were lots of important emails on the tapes and so the argument was a con.

The conduct examined in Kipperman is reminiscent of the chameleon-like actions described in 1100 West, LLC v. Red Spot Paint & Varnish Co., Case No. 1:05-cv-1670-LJM-JMS (S.D. Ill. June 5, 2009), which I discussed in last week’s blog. Whereas 1100 West resulted in sanctions against the party and the law firm representing it, the amount of which has yet to be determined, the discovery abuses in Kipperman resulted in sanctions of over a million dollars, but against the party alone. Still, the conduct in Kipperman caused Judge Forrester to come very close to entering what he called “the largest default judgment sought by a defendant in the history of the nation,” and, as I point out in the conclusion, the case is not over yet. Kipperman v. Onex Corp., supra at 19.

Over Lawyered

There have been multiple orders entered in Kipperman before the opinion here at issue. It has been pending for over four years and has over 600 docket entries. I have written about the last major order entered in this case on September 19, 2008 in my article, Why E-Discovery is Ruining Litigation in America and What Can Be Done About It. Although Judge Forrester’s latest opinion is focused on the conduct of defendants and their counsel, he begins the opinion with a broad-shot against all of the parties and their legal counsel:

The lengthy discovery process, which has spawned four discovery hearings, has been contentious at best and abusive at worst, and the court has expressed its displeasure with the parties’ behavior on numerous occasions.

Following the official close of fact discovery, the court expressed its frustration with the proceedings in its March 19, 2008 Case Management Order. The court chronicled the parties’ missteps, noted that this matter was being “over lawyered” on all sides, made clear that it would not compel parties to comply with orders already issued by the court, and notified the parties that it was currently tallying their disobedience and would award sanctions at their request.

Id. at *1.

Search for Email on Fifty Backup Tapes

The plaintiff responded to this invitation by requesting a variety of sanctions against defendants, including the ultimate sanction of default. There were many discovery abuses described in plaintiff’s motion, but the core problem concerned electronic discovery issues revolving around email and “ten labeled and forty unlabeled backup tapes.” Id. at *6. Yes, this is another backup tapes sanction case involving thee whereabouts of missing email. In a nutshell, early in the case defendants produced very few emails in response to plaintiff’s initial request for production of electronic records for the time period in question by this lawsuit – 1999-2003. Defendants explained that they did not use email that much back then, that it was before they adopted BlackBerries, and very few remained in their active systems. They claimed that their tapes were “not reasonably accessible” and as such were excluded from discovery under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Note that if defendants had not saved these tapes to begin with, they would not have had this problem. They are in effect paying a very high price for unwise retention policies and IT pack-rats.)

Defendants argued that any search of their tapes would be expensive, but unlikely to find any email of value, since they were not using email much back then anyway. That was the clients’ story and their attorneys were advancing it with a vengeance. Based on later findings made by Judge Forrester, one wonders whether they even asked the key witnesses whether this was true or not?

The plaintiff at first apparently accepted the defendants’ word and did not push the point. But then the plaintiff received a production from a third party that included eighteen emails written by defendants. These emails strongly undercut defendants story that it was rare for them to use emails and BlackBerries at the turn of the century. Based on this discovery, the plaintiff moved to compel the production and search of the “ten labeled and forty unlabeled backup tapes” that defendants admitted they had and might contain emails.

Pig in a Poke

pig in a poke aka bagAt a hearing on this issue, defense counsel argued that the restoration of the backup tapes should not be required because no one knew what was on those tapes. For this reason it would be foolish to require expensive restoration, since it would be like buying a pig in a poke.

… [W]e’re talking about somewhere around 380 to $410,000 worth of costs. And for what? No one literally knows. … So what we have is a pig in a poke, but for everybody. No one knows what’s in there.

Id. at *7. As we will see, Judge Forrester at first bought this argument, but then later, after some peeks into the bag, the poke, decided that the defendants and their counsel must have known all along exactly what was in there, and it was not good. It was not an empty bag. It was a bag full of vicious-cat-like incriminating emails.

The Court first had some sympathy for the pig in a poke argument and crafted a compromise order that allowed for sampling of two of the fifty backup tapes. This order in effect allowed the plaintiff to peak and see if the bag was empty, as defendants suggested it would be. Or if it had contents, whether it would be “pigs or cats in the poke.” To use the modern legal vernacular, whether the email in the backup tapes would be smoking guns or silver bullets.

The court directed Plaintiff to designate two tapes and design a search and directed Defendants to pay for it. The court made Plaintiff the guarantor of the search’s success, however, and granted Defendants the right to demand fees if it produced little discoverable material.

Id.

That seems like a fair decision. Only two out of the fifty tapes had to be searched and if defendants were right, and there was not much email use back then, the plaintiff would have to pay for the futile search. Further, if the search design proposed by the plaintiff was not reasonable and narrow in focus, the defendants could object and move for a protective order.

Lots of Cats Found in the Poke

cat.in.bagIt turns out that there were lots of email on the two backup tapes and many of them were smoking guns detrimental to the defense. Here is Judge Forrester’s description of what happened next:

Plaintiff selected its tapes and provided its terms by January 16, 2008. Defendants performed a search on the two tapes, received hits resulting in thousands of documents, and began releasing documents to Plaintiff on a rolling basis. Defendants unilaterally decided to search seven witnesses’ mailboxes rather than the entire tape and decided to redact documents. Defendants chose the seven boxes of the individuals Plaintiff wished to depose. These were the witnesses Defendants believed had knowledge or had something to do with the instant matter. Defendants refused to search the hundred or so mailboxes of employees they believed were not related to the case. Plaintiff found Defendants’ production to be incomplete.

Id.

Plaintiff then moved to compel again, seeking search of all mailboxes and an additional backup tape thought to have a missing time period. This lead to another hearing where, according to Judge Forrester:

Defendants argued against an additional tape and contended that only a portion of the existing production was relevant. Defendants explained that the volume of the production was related to (1) the broad nature of Plaintiff’s search terms, (2) the fact that many of the e-mails contained spreadsheets with multiple blank pages, (3) the fact that attachments were reproduced every time an e-mail was forwarded or replied to, and (4) Plaintiff’s demand for every e-mail sent to or received by certain individuals including items they were copied on. Plaintiff’s counsel represented to the court that at least ten to twenty percent of the documents were extremely relevant, or the kind of documents that the Trustee would put on an exhibit list at trial. Defendants informed the court that it had cost them more than $600,000 to search the two tapes. This figure included attorney time for privilege review. Defendants never filed a protective order asking to be relieved of the burden of searching the entire tapes.

Id. at *8.

Note that even though Judge Forrester started off the opinion by saying that the case had been “over-lawyered,” he will hammer defense counsel here for not immediately filing a motion for protective order. The moral of the story is one we have seen in several prior cases, if you want protection for expensive backup tape search, you need to file the motion before you do the work, not afterwards. See: In re Fannie Mae Securities Litigation, _F.3d_, 2009 WL 215282009 (D.C. App. Jan. 6, 2009).

Cats are Out of the Bag and they Bite

cat.viciousWhat really seemed to get to Judge Forrester was the nature of the emails discovered. Plaintiff argued that ten to twenty percent of the documents were extremely relevant, that is hot-docs, otherwise known as “smoking guns.” The judge read many of these emails himself to decide these motions and he found that the plaintiff was right.

The court itself examined examples of some of the e-mails produced to assess relevance: “I don’t consider myself enough of an expert on the law in this area to declare these to be smoking guns but they certainly are hot and they certainly do smell like they have been discharged lately.”(Tr. 04/29/08 54:10-13). The court stated that it would enforce its existing order but that it would give Defendants a chance to narrow Plaintiff’s search terms and provide Plaintiff with a list of employees, their positions, departments, etc., so that Plaintiff could agree to narrow the number of employee boxes that needed to be searched. The court also agreed to give Plaintiff an additional tape.

Id. at *8.

Judge Forrester would of course wonder how it is that defendants did not know about these emails all along. If the emails discovered has just been marginally important, the defendants story might have had some credibility. The plaintiff’s charge of a cover-up might not have rung true. But with so much email found, and much of it highly relevant, it stretches credibility to think this evidence was not well known to defendants all along. This may explain the court’ testy reaction to defendants failure to move for a protective order until after the fact. The comment in footnote four of the opinion as to a colloquy between judge and defense counsel is particularly interesting:

During the hearing defense counsel attempted to justify his earlier statements to the court about e-mail and justify Defendants’ actions. Defense counsel also conceded that Defendants should have asked for a protective order with respect to its initial production. The court said:

… I didn’t say come close. I said this is what you have to do. That’s an order of the court, and as an officer of the court you are obliged to follow that or to get a protective order to get relieved of that, and failing either, maybe you have to get rid of your client, I don’t know, but what I’m trying to explain to you is something that’s been said a lot before. Close doesn’t count in hand grenades, horseshoes and it doesn’t count here when you have to abide by an order of the court. …

Id.

After this hearing the defendants searched the other custodians and other tape as ordered, and started to produce more emails. Plaintiff complained that they were not getting all of the emails they expected, and more motions followed, including this time a motion for protective order by defendants. Defendants argued that one of the search terms specified, “Armtec,” produced too many false positives. The judge agreed with them on that point and granted protection from production of those documents. But defendants also argued that they could withhold select documents uncovered by the other keyword search terms specified by plaintiff if they deemed them the hits to be irrelevant. Judge Forrester did not buy that argument, implying that defendants were, at this point, not to be trusted. Judge Forrester’s reasoning on this point is very instructive and worth a full reading:

Defendants certified their production as complete for the last time in December 2008. The court believes that some of the most interesting evidence in this matter has come from e-mail production. The court is deeply disturbed by Defendants’ handling of this production. The court recognizes the difficulties associated with electronic discovery and notably the difficulties in producing older documents archived on mediums which were not designed to withstand the rigorous searching associated with modern e-discovery. As such, the court does not fault Defendants for their initial refusal to produce electronic discovery from the so called “backup tapes” or for asserting legitimate legal arguments under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(B) in their response to Plaintiff’s initial motion to compel this information. The court does condemn Defendants, however, for making blatant misrepresentations about the value of e-mail discovery in this case in an effort to influence the court’s ruling, for refusing to follow the court’s ruling once made, and for behaving as if they, and not the court, got to decide what electronic material was relevant and discoverable under Rule 26 and what material was not.

Experienced defense counsel misrepresented the scope and value of e-mail discovery to this matter. The court has outlined the colloquy that occurred between it and defense counsel regarding e-mail during the January 9, 2008 hearing. Defense counsel notably argued: (1) “Plaintiffs don’t know and we don’t know whether there is a single e-mail on there, a single e-mail in any way related to this case”; (2) “[t]he fact that there are two or three emails that they have found in the Magnatrax documents would tend to indicate that there is a very low likelihood of any e-mails”; (3) “they didn’t even ask Mr. Wright, who they took as a 30(b)(6) witness, a single, you know, question about e-mail usage and what might be stored and what might not be stored”; (4) “[w]e are at the end of discovery, they finally decided … this is interesting to them. It hasn’t been critical until today, but now it’s critical”; and (5) “[w]e don’t even know whether people readily used e-mails. This was not a BlackBerry era at the time.”Counsel also relied upon an employee affidavit and argued that there would be considerable overlap of date on different backup tapes.

*10 The court relied upon these statements to make a determination under Rule 26(b)(2) as to whether Plaintiff had shown “good cause” to order discovery of the backup tapes, whether discovery of all of the tapes would be cumulative or duplicative, and in sum whether the burden or expense of the discovery outweighed its likely benefit. The court relied on these statements in crafting the “two tape” solution at Defendants’ expense with Plaintiff to bear the cost should the search ultimately be fruitless. Looking at the state of the record as a whole, it now appears that defense counsel’s statements were either purposefully misleading or made with a reckless disregard for the truth.

… The issue of backup email discovery was certainly not something that Plaintiff only became interested in on the eve of a discovery deadline. Second, both Plaintiff and Defendants’ counsel were aware that the parties involved in this case used e-mail. … This e-mail indicated that at least one of the relevant parties was using BlackBerry technology at this time, and such technology is synonymous with the regular use of e-mail. Despite defense counsel’s assertions it is clear that Plaintiff’s counsel did discuss e-mail usage and retention with Nigel Wright during Onex’s 30(b)(6) deposition. (Id. Ex 5, at Ex A). Further, the court finds it absolutely inconceivable that defense counsel did not know in January of 2008, more than two years into the case and more than one year into full discovery, whether his client readily used e-mails. Any competent counsel should be expected to ask his client such questions in the infancy of discovery. If counsel did not know, it was because he did not wish to know, and reckless indifference to the truth of a matter is a close brother to willful omission or misrepresentation. FN6

FN6. The court finds it notable that Defendants’ legal team chose to have local counsel argue the e-mail portion of the hearing. Local counsel likely had the least personal knowledge about the workings of Onex and Magnatrax and the least daily telephone and face contact with the clients. Therefore, the court can conceive of a situation in which local counsel had not had discussions about e-mail usage with his client. Regardless, he was responsible for being familiar with the state of the record. Further, his co-counsel were responsible for ensuring that he made no misrepresentations to the court or for correcting any made.

Id. at *9-*10.

Fool Me Once, Shame On You;
Fool Me Twice, Shame On Me

The chameleon attorneys have now been exposed. Judge Forrester now knows who he is dealing with. This in part explains the harsh sanctions that resulted, in spite of the fact that Judge Forrester clearly recognized the difficulties associated with electronic discovery in general and backup tapes in particular.

If defense counsel had acted independently from their clients, and been forthright about the problems, then, in my opinion, sanctions could have been avoided entirely and they would not have alienated the presiding judge. That is never a smart thing to do. The truth contained in the email would still have come out, but that is as it should be. The job of a lawyer is to argue the meaning of facts and the consequences that should flow from them, not to hide or change the facts. If the defense had been handled differently, the whole process would have been far less prejudicial to defendants. Moreover, the judge would likely have restricted discovery and the whole process would have been far less expensive and aggravating.

Eleventh Circuit Sanctions Law

Judge Forrester spends the first sixteen pages outlining the facts of discovery abuse. In the last three pages he explains what the law in the Eleventh Circuit requires him to do under these troubling circumstances. He begins with the rules.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(g) was “designed to curb discovery abuse by explicitly encouraging the imposition of sanctions.” Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 987 F.2d 1536, 1542 (11th Cir.1993). Rule 26(g) states:

(1) Signature Required; Effect of Signature. Every disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1) or (a)(3) and every discovery request, response, or objection must be signed by at least one attorney of record…. By signing, an attorney or party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry:

(A) with respect to a disclosure, it is complete and correct as of the time it is made; and (*17)

(B) with respect to a discovery request, response, or objection, it is: (i) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law, or for establishing new law; (ii) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and (iii) neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the action. ….

(3) Sanction for Improper Certification. If a certification violates this rule without substantial justification, the court, on motion or on its own, must impose an appropriate sanction on the signer, the party on whose behalf the signer was acting, or both. The sanction may include an order to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the violation.

“The decision whether to impose sanctions under Rule 26(g)(3) is not discretionary,” and “[o]nce the court makes the factual determination that a discovery filing was signed in violation of the rule, it must impose ‘an appropriate sanction.’ ” Id. at 1372. The court does have considerable discretion in determining what sanction is appropriate. Id. However, an order imposing costs under Rule 26(g)(3) should be limited to the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation. Id. at 1372 n. 45.

District courts enjoy substantially more discretion in deciding whether and how to impose sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37. Id. at 1366.A district court may impose sanctions against a party which violates a discovery order “as are just.” Id. …

Id. at 16-17.

Judge Forrester then examines the additional authority he has under the common law to impose sanctions.

*18 A court may also sanction litigation misconduct using its inherent power “to manage [its] own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., No. 08-11026, 2009 WL 613603, *5 (11th Cir. Mar.12, 2005) (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991)). The court must exercise its power, however, with restraint and discretion. Id. “The key to unlocking the court’s inherent power is a finding of bad faith,” and a party may demonstrate bad faith by delaying or disrupting litigation or hampering the enforcement of a court order. In re Sunshine Jr. Stores, Inc., 456 F.3d 1291, 1304 (11th Cir.2006). A party is entitled to due process before a court determines that the party has acted in bad faith and the court invokes its inherent power to impose sanctions and assess fees. Id. at 1306. “Due process requires that the party be given fair notice that its conduct may warrant sanctions and the reasons why.” Id. at 1306-07.A party can be given fair notice by either the court or the party seeking sanctions. Id. Once a party has notice that it might be subject to sanctions, the court must afford it the opportunity to justify its actions either orally or in writing. Id. …

Id. at *18.

Textbook Case of Discovery Abuse

Judge Forrester then makes the statement on textbook case that I have chosen as the byline for Kipperman v. Onex Corp.:

The court regards the instant case as a textbook case of discovery abuse. The court finds that Plaintiff has been prejudiced in two ways-the Trustee has been denied all the documents necessary to depose witnesses and prepare expert reports and the Trustee’s preparation has been made disjointed and difficult and it has been forced to expend a fair amount of time and money and effort to get that which should have been more easily obtained. … Defendants’ only defense is their unpersuasive argument that they have now complied and Plaintiff has suffered no prejudice. Defendants’ defense completely ignores the burdens the court and Plaintiff have endured to garner their compliance and the destructive precedent this court would set were it to allow Defendants to escape the consequences of three years of bad behavior simply because they believe they have now complied.

Id.

Stated Reasons for the $1,022,700 Sanction

Judge Forrester then explains why he decided to only award monetary sanctions, albeit in an amount of $1,022,700, and not simply enter judgment for the plaintiff.

*19 Plaintiff has asked the court for the ultimate sanction. Given the Defendants’ behavior, the court is tempted to grant Plaintiff’s request. That being said, the court will not strike Defendants’ answer. The court believes there are novel issues of liability present in this matter. Further, the ad damnum clause in this case is hundreds of millions of dollars. Were this court to avoid trying this case on the merits, it might be granting the largest default judgment sought by a defendant in the history of the nation. As this matter currently stands, Plaintiff has the raw material and documentation it needs to proceed with its case and this court has the means, through re-depositions and supplemental expert reports, to minimize a large portion of the damage done. The court is simply unwilling to take the dramatic action of striking Defendants’ answer and entering default in the face of moderate prejudice. That being said, Defendants should not and will not go unpunished. The court will exercise its discretion under Rules 26 and 37 and its inherent powers to award monetary sanctions.

Id. at *19.

Conclusion

Sanctions in an amount of $1,022,700 are not minor, but in view of the total amount at issue here, they are not really that severe. Some may think that defendants got off too lightly. But, please remember, the case is not over yet. Indeed, it is about to go to trial. There will be other consequences for the behavior of defendants and their counsel. Judge Forrester will, after all, be making many more rulings just before, during, and after the trial. Once a lawyer has been “outed” as a chameleon, there is no turning back. It is also likely that the jury will learn about some or all of the defendants’ textbook discovery misconduct during this case. The final punishment for defendants’ misconduct will be welded by the judge and jury ruling on the ultimate merits of this case.

Unlike a default sanction judgment, which carries a high risk of reversal on appeal, a final judgment entered after a full trial to a jury on the merits is very difficult to overturn. All experienced trail counsel understand that the risks of appeal often enter into a judge’s decision. Judge Forrester’s ruling may appear to be lenient, but after the trial is over and the jury has spoken, the wisdom of his mercy will be obvious. He has read the email, the smoking guns that defendants tried so hard to hide. No doubt he is confident that justice will be done once a jury reads them too.